December 6, 2006
Iraq and Vietnam: The Search for Analogies
Paul Miles
Lecturer in History at Princeton University
Minutes of the 12th Meeting of the 65th Year
The twelfth meeting of the Old Guard in its 65th year was opened by President Joseph A. Giormaine at 10:15 AM. Members rose to join Dr. George Hansen in the singing of the invocation. Minutes of the last meeting by Kenneth Barnharth featured an engaging report on James Harford’s recounting of his biography of Thomas Merton. Ken’s minutes showed a magnificent grasp of the varied spiritual and not always sanctified adventures of Thomas Merton and his two closest friends, Bob Lax and Ed Rice.
Guest Dr. Norman Katz was introduced by Herbert Kane. Visitor Joseph Burn was introduced by Dr. Harvey Rothberg.
Bob Varin introduced the speaker, Col. Paul L. Miles, a graduate of West Point with a distinguished military career, now a Lecturer on Military History at Princeton University, he was recently awarded a Phi Beta Kappa key for his teaching.
Col. Miles’ subject for the day was “Iraq and Vietnam: The Search for Analogies”. He began by noting that in the months leading up to the invasion in March 2003, many cautioned against such a move citing the “Vietnam quagmire” as the inevitable consequence. A year later critics still used this analogy, underlining various histories that placed the engagement of the U.S. in Vietnam at anything from 8 to 25 years.
However, the search for valid analogies runs into many dead ends. In Iraq, the U.S. led conventional invasion defeated the Iraq Army, but soon an insurgency began, followed by sectarian warfare. In Vietnam we knew the enemy, in Iraq there are many including disaffected Baathists, Al Quaeda, infiltrated insurgents and sectarian militias. So, too, in Vietnam we had a goal – containing the North Vietnamese Communism; in Iraq the administration’s stated goal is nation building, and establishing terrorist free democracies throughout the Middle East as well as rolling back Islamic fundamentalism.
Debates over the legacies of the two wars often pit the observation that Vietnam had little effect on the Cold War and the standing of the U.S. in international diplomatic circles. The legacy of the Iraq war, on the other hand, could have ominous consequences including regional conflagration and, on the home front, a growing credibility gap between both congress and the administration visa vis citizens, people overseas and the international diplomatic community.
Col. Miles concluded with a question: “Will a quagmire create a real analogy with Vietnam – an Iraq syndrome?” The reference is to the “Vietnam syndrome” which conservatives opposed as an “undesirable pacifism on the part of the American public and the U.S. government domestically and in international affairs?” (Wikipedia)
A lively question and answer period raised questions about the absence of a draft and no calls for sacrifice distancing most Americans from concern about this conflict, in spite of constant media attention. Also, to the question “What have we learned from the Iraq War?” Col. Miles emphasized the need for training in advance and planning for occupation and post war governance.
Respectfully submitted,
Nicholas B. Van Dyck
Guest Dr. Norman Katz was introduced by Herbert Kane. Visitor Joseph Burn was introduced by Dr. Harvey Rothberg.
Bob Varin introduced the speaker, Col. Paul L. Miles, a graduate of West Point with a distinguished military career, now a Lecturer on Military History at Princeton University, he was recently awarded a Phi Beta Kappa key for his teaching.
Col. Miles’ subject for the day was “Iraq and Vietnam: The Search for Analogies”. He began by noting that in the months leading up to the invasion in March 2003, many cautioned against such a move citing the “Vietnam quagmire” as the inevitable consequence. A year later critics still used this analogy, underlining various histories that placed the engagement of the U.S. in Vietnam at anything from 8 to 25 years.
However, the search for valid analogies runs into many dead ends. In Iraq, the U.S. led conventional invasion defeated the Iraq Army, but soon an insurgency began, followed by sectarian warfare. In Vietnam we knew the enemy, in Iraq there are many including disaffected Baathists, Al Quaeda, infiltrated insurgents and sectarian militias. So, too, in Vietnam we had a goal – containing the North Vietnamese Communism; in Iraq the administration’s stated goal is nation building, and establishing terrorist free democracies throughout the Middle East as well as rolling back Islamic fundamentalism.
Debates over the legacies of the two wars often pit the observation that Vietnam had little effect on the Cold War and the standing of the U.S. in international diplomatic circles. The legacy of the Iraq war, on the other hand, could have ominous consequences including regional conflagration and, on the home front, a growing credibility gap between both congress and the administration visa vis citizens, people overseas and the international diplomatic community.
Col. Miles concluded with a question: “Will a quagmire create a real analogy with Vietnam – an Iraq syndrome?” The reference is to the “Vietnam syndrome” which conservatives opposed as an “undesirable pacifism on the part of the American public and the U.S. government domestically and in international affairs?” (Wikipedia)
A lively question and answer period raised questions about the absence of a draft and no calls for sacrifice distancing most Americans from concern about this conflict, in spite of constant media attention. Also, to the question “What have we learned from the Iraq War?” Col. Miles emphasized the need for training in advance and planning for occupation and post war governance.
Respectfully submitted,
Nicholas B. Van Dyck