January 3, 2007
Battle of Princeton
Laura Crockett
Author, Trustee and VP of Princeton Battlefield Society
Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the 65th Year
President Giordmaine called the 78 attending members at the Friend Centre to order for the 14th meeting of the 64th year at 10:15 AM following the forty-five minutes hospitality hour. George Fokker led the invocation.
Ruth Miller read her clear minutes of the meeting of December 13. Bill Schoelwer introduced visitors: his wife, son, and daughter-in-law.
David Dodge urged members to volunteer to speak at short notice, noting that we had already had two such speakers. He went on to introduce the speaker, Laura Crockett, author, guide and trustee of the Princeton Battlefield Society and their vice-president for public relations. Related to Davy Crockett, she was already hooked on American history when she moved to this state from California and became entranced with New Jersey’s history. She was a co-producer of the Princeton Battlefield Festivals of 2005 and ’06. Her talk was suitable for this day since exactly 230 years ago the battle took place.
Beginning with a quotation from Tom Paine, it was immediately apparent that Ms Crockett is a buoyant and exuberant fan of the revolutionary cause. She provided a survey of the developing conflict - in fact three-quarters of her time was expended on the lead-up to the Princeton battle. Her boundless advocacy of their cause led her to write off the Seven Years War as a “little European conflict” between Britain and France, an arbitrary imposition of someone else’s agenda. But the war began in North America; it was even provoked, by colonials like Lieutenant Colonel Washington of the Virginia Regiment. Known here as the French and Indian War, it resulted in the colonials’ yearned-for removal of the threat which colonists had fretted about since the Pilgrims landed. Indeed, when they learned of the generous terms offered to the French-Canadians in the Quebec Act they dubbed the Act "intolerable."
The impression that Ms Crockett thought Parliament was really striving to entangle colonists in someone else’s schemes was strengthened by her suggestion that the British government acted selfishly tried to unload their military tax burden onto American shoulders. But the truth is that, quite apart from the war itself, it cost the British taxpayer an estimated ₤350,000 a year just to provide for the colonists’ defence, particularly against the Indians. Two battalions of the Royal American Regiment, giving employment to two thousand Americans, were provided by the British taxpayer. Thus was the Stamp Act designed to raise only 17 percent of the defence costs. As we see in current politics, so it is in the study of history: the pursuit of partisan advocacy has both strengths and weaknesses. For example, was the tea tossed into Boston harbour just a protest against tax, or was it because Boston merchants feared being undercut by the much lower prices that tea would cost if that tea was put on the market? That Ms Crockett had not completely capitulated to popular mythology was clear when she recognized the fallacy of some widely accepted anachronisms, such as having Paul Revere shout from his horse, “The British are coming, the British are coming!” She also rejected the idea of a cannon ball having decapitated the King’s portrait in Nassau Hall.
In her account of the battle, she provided a good power-point map and convincing speculations on the role of Culloden in General Mercer’s psychology. And the nature of the victory seemed a bit vague. Washington did not win a tactical victory. Tactically, it was a draw and both sides, appropriately, quitted the field afterwards. The Crown could claim that Mawhood’s single small English battalion marched and counter-marched through virtually the entire Continental Army, losing half its men before they made their way successfully south to rejoin their brigade at Trenton. To this day the battalion bears the only battle honour the King awarded for the entire American war – a wreath. Their behaviour explains how a former colonel of the earlier 17th of Foot could entitle his talk at the battlefield commemoration a few years ago, "The Battle of Princeton: Why We Didn’t Lose It." Incidentally, their Regimental Colour bears a Bengal tiger, for service in India, not in honour of Princeton.
While Princeton was no tactical victory, it was a strategic one of enormous importance. An amateur had embarrassed the professionals. Washington’s triumph was simply to be there, for which our speaker gave him due credit. One point that needs emphasis is that his troops were not militia, who were conspicuous by their absence, particularly at this early point in the struggle – it is even arguable whether New Jersey provided more volunteers for the other George than it did for George Washington; numbers are hard to come by. As against militia, the Continentals were the equivalent of regulars. They moved in European close-order. They did not snipe from behind trees. That is the significance of the battle – a significance not lost on either side, to which she correctly pointed.
Several members asked questions to which the speaker replied and the meeting was adjourned at 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
John Frederick
Ruth Miller read her clear minutes of the meeting of December 13. Bill Schoelwer introduced visitors: his wife, son, and daughter-in-law.
David Dodge urged members to volunteer to speak at short notice, noting that we had already had two such speakers. He went on to introduce the speaker, Laura Crockett, author, guide and trustee of the Princeton Battlefield Society and their vice-president for public relations. Related to Davy Crockett, she was already hooked on American history when she moved to this state from California and became entranced with New Jersey’s history. She was a co-producer of the Princeton Battlefield Festivals of 2005 and ’06. Her talk was suitable for this day since exactly 230 years ago the battle took place.
Beginning with a quotation from Tom Paine, it was immediately apparent that Ms Crockett is a buoyant and exuberant fan of the revolutionary cause. She provided a survey of the developing conflict - in fact three-quarters of her time was expended on the lead-up to the Princeton battle. Her boundless advocacy of their cause led her to write off the Seven Years War as a “little European conflict” between Britain and France, an arbitrary imposition of someone else’s agenda. But the war began in North America; it was even provoked, by colonials like Lieutenant Colonel Washington of the Virginia Regiment. Known here as the French and Indian War, it resulted in the colonials’ yearned-for removal of the threat which colonists had fretted about since the Pilgrims landed. Indeed, when they learned of the generous terms offered to the French-Canadians in the Quebec Act they dubbed the Act "intolerable."
The impression that Ms Crockett thought Parliament was really striving to entangle colonists in someone else’s schemes was strengthened by her suggestion that the British government acted selfishly tried to unload their military tax burden onto American shoulders. But the truth is that, quite apart from the war itself, it cost the British taxpayer an estimated ₤350,000 a year just to provide for the colonists’ defence, particularly against the Indians. Two battalions of the Royal American Regiment, giving employment to two thousand Americans, were provided by the British taxpayer. Thus was the Stamp Act designed to raise only 17 percent of the defence costs. As we see in current politics, so it is in the study of history: the pursuit of partisan advocacy has both strengths and weaknesses. For example, was the tea tossed into Boston harbour just a protest against tax, or was it because Boston merchants feared being undercut by the much lower prices that tea would cost if that tea was put on the market? That Ms Crockett had not completely capitulated to popular mythology was clear when she recognized the fallacy of some widely accepted anachronisms, such as having Paul Revere shout from his horse, “The British are coming, the British are coming!” She also rejected the idea of a cannon ball having decapitated the King’s portrait in Nassau Hall.
In her account of the battle, she provided a good power-point map and convincing speculations on the role of Culloden in General Mercer’s psychology. And the nature of the victory seemed a bit vague. Washington did not win a tactical victory. Tactically, it was a draw and both sides, appropriately, quitted the field afterwards. The Crown could claim that Mawhood’s single small English battalion marched and counter-marched through virtually the entire Continental Army, losing half its men before they made their way successfully south to rejoin their brigade at Trenton. To this day the battalion bears the only battle honour the King awarded for the entire American war – a wreath. Their behaviour explains how a former colonel of the earlier 17th of Foot could entitle his talk at the battlefield commemoration a few years ago, "The Battle of Princeton: Why We Didn’t Lose It." Incidentally, their Regimental Colour bears a Bengal tiger, for service in India, not in honour of Princeton.
While Princeton was no tactical victory, it was a strategic one of enormous importance. An amateur had embarrassed the professionals. Washington’s triumph was simply to be there, for which our speaker gave him due credit. One point that needs emphasis is that his troops were not militia, who were conspicuous by their absence, particularly at this early point in the struggle – it is even arguable whether New Jersey provided more volunteers for the other George than it did for George Washington; numbers are hard to come by. As against militia, the Continentals were the equivalent of regulars. They moved in European close-order. They did not snipe from behind trees. That is the significance of the battle – a significance not lost on either side, to which she correctly pointed.
Several members asked questions to which the speaker replied and the meeting was adjourned at 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
John Frederick