February 23, 2011
Notes from Afghanistan: With A Marine Corps Combat Correspondent
Andrew Lubin
Author, Analyst and Independent Foreign Correspondent
Minutes of the 19th Meeting of the 69th Year
The meeting was called to order at 10:15 AM by President Bob Varrin. Don Elders led the invocation. Three guests were introduced: Didi Waltman by Bob Waltman, Alan Hegedus by Jack Wallack, and Paul Schlieben by Ernest Schlieben. Jim Ferry read the minutes of the previous meeting. Jack Reilly conducted the election of new members: H. Brown Elmes, George McLaughlin, Janis P. Pell, Jotham Johnson, Rhoda K. Wagman, Donald Shaffer, and Joel Greenberg. A motion to elect the new members was made and passed without objection.
The speaker and program for next week’s meeting were announced. The attendance is estimated to be about 100 (+ or -)
The speaker, Andrew Lubin was introduced by George Hansen. Lubin has a BA from Allegheny College and a Masters from Thunderbird School of Global Management. Both his parents served in the Marine Corps during WWII and his son is on his fifth deployment with the Marines in Afghanistan.
Lubin has been embedded with the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experiences provided the content for his book, “Charlie Battery; A Marine Artillery Battery in Iraq”.
The title of Andrew Lubin’s talk was “Counterinsurgency; a Strategy for Failed States - On Patrol with the U. S. Marines.”
The presentation began with a description of threats around the globe. With slides displaying charts and annotated maps, he identified threats to stability; economic, military, failed states, even natural disasters. We are involved globally, sometimes with humanitarian assistance as in Haiti, sometimes in nation building as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military and the Marine Corps in particular, have a world view in order to be prepared for whatever may develop.
None of these problems can be addressed by conventional military operations. Our military was prepared to fight nation on nation wars where both sides wore uniforms and it was easy to identify the enemy. Vietnam was the first war in which our enemy was not in uniform. Since Korea, the only “conventional” wars have been Desert Storm in 1991 and the first weeks of Iraq in 2003.
At this point, Lubin shifted to address the war in Afghanistan.
He reminded us that our own history includes insurgents. During the Revolutionary War, Colonel Francis Marion was an insurgent leading irregulars in ambushing and harassing the British army. Like the insurgents we face in Afghanistan, his fighters wore no uniforms and melted into the local population between engagements.
We should not underestimate the Afghanistan insurgents; they are smart, brave and effective. A successful insurgent is one who lives to fight another day. The enemy lives among the locals and depends on the locals for support. He fights when he wants to and then disappears into the local population.
Lubin asserted that a lot is riding on our success in Afghanistan. If we fail, “… it will empower every religious extremist, every pirate, every warlord and every dictator …”.
There are two types of Taliban, “Big T” and “Small T”. The “Big T” guys are ideologically or religiously opposed to the West. They are the true enemy. The “Small T” people are undecided. They will side with whomever they believe will bring stability to their lives. The Marine strategy is to push the “BigT’ out, keep them out and then work with the locals to earn their trust. When they trust the Marines they are also an essential source of intelligence. This strategy has been called COIN, short for counterinsurgency.
An example of the Marine strategy was Operation Khanjar in Helmand province. A force of 4000 Marines with helicopter gunship support drove out the Taliban fighters. After the battle, the Marines set up their camp very close to the town of Nawa. During the day, the Marines patrolled the town, chatting with the locals, buying fruits or vegetables, and providing some services. For example, they cleaned out the canals which were critical in providing water for irrigation. The locals learned that the Marines were not occupiers but customers and friends. The officers would meet with the town elders and discuss problems and solutions. With security, the locals planned and implemented a waterwheel-powered electrical generator. They took ownership of their welfare. In order to maintain the security, they also alerted the Marines about Taliban activity and identified the bad guys. Eventually the Marines turned Nawa over to the Afghan army and police and it remains peaceful. This was a successful counterinsurgency.
In summary, building up local government and satisfying people’s basic needs is the best answer to reviving a failed state. When local people are empowered to address the local problems and take ownership of the process, the result is like the success in Nawa.
After thanking us for the opportunity to address the Old Guard, Lubin elicited a dozen questions to which he responded. His answers informed us that the Taliban get money from drug sales and sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and weapons from Eastern European countries. Al Qaeda is a bigger problem in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. And “YES” we should be talking to the Taliban.
One member considering a career change, asked about the prerequisites to becoming a war lord. Think Tony Soprano.
Respectfully submitted,
Anthony S. Glockler
The speaker and program for next week’s meeting were announced. The attendance is estimated to be about 100 (+ or -)
The speaker, Andrew Lubin was introduced by George Hansen. Lubin has a BA from Allegheny College and a Masters from Thunderbird School of Global Management. Both his parents served in the Marine Corps during WWII and his son is on his fifth deployment with the Marines in Afghanistan.
Lubin has been embedded with the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experiences provided the content for his book, “Charlie Battery; A Marine Artillery Battery in Iraq”.
The title of Andrew Lubin’s talk was “Counterinsurgency; a Strategy for Failed States - On Patrol with the U. S. Marines.”
The presentation began with a description of threats around the globe. With slides displaying charts and annotated maps, he identified threats to stability; economic, military, failed states, even natural disasters. We are involved globally, sometimes with humanitarian assistance as in Haiti, sometimes in nation building as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military and the Marine Corps in particular, have a world view in order to be prepared for whatever may develop.
None of these problems can be addressed by conventional military operations. Our military was prepared to fight nation on nation wars where both sides wore uniforms and it was easy to identify the enemy. Vietnam was the first war in which our enemy was not in uniform. Since Korea, the only “conventional” wars have been Desert Storm in 1991 and the first weeks of Iraq in 2003.
At this point, Lubin shifted to address the war in Afghanistan.
He reminded us that our own history includes insurgents. During the Revolutionary War, Colonel Francis Marion was an insurgent leading irregulars in ambushing and harassing the British army. Like the insurgents we face in Afghanistan, his fighters wore no uniforms and melted into the local population between engagements.
We should not underestimate the Afghanistan insurgents; they are smart, brave and effective. A successful insurgent is one who lives to fight another day. The enemy lives among the locals and depends on the locals for support. He fights when he wants to and then disappears into the local population.
Lubin asserted that a lot is riding on our success in Afghanistan. If we fail, “… it will empower every religious extremist, every pirate, every warlord and every dictator …”.
There are two types of Taliban, “Big T” and “Small T”. The “Big T” guys are ideologically or religiously opposed to the West. They are the true enemy. The “Small T” people are undecided. They will side with whomever they believe will bring stability to their lives. The Marine strategy is to push the “BigT’ out, keep them out and then work with the locals to earn their trust. When they trust the Marines they are also an essential source of intelligence. This strategy has been called COIN, short for counterinsurgency.
An example of the Marine strategy was Operation Khanjar in Helmand province. A force of 4000 Marines with helicopter gunship support drove out the Taliban fighters. After the battle, the Marines set up their camp very close to the town of Nawa. During the day, the Marines patrolled the town, chatting with the locals, buying fruits or vegetables, and providing some services. For example, they cleaned out the canals which were critical in providing water for irrigation. The locals learned that the Marines were not occupiers but customers and friends. The officers would meet with the town elders and discuss problems and solutions. With security, the locals planned and implemented a waterwheel-powered electrical generator. They took ownership of their welfare. In order to maintain the security, they also alerted the Marines about Taliban activity and identified the bad guys. Eventually the Marines turned Nawa over to the Afghan army and police and it remains peaceful. This was a successful counterinsurgency.
In summary, building up local government and satisfying people’s basic needs is the best answer to reviving a failed state. When local people are empowered to address the local problems and take ownership of the process, the result is like the success in Nawa.
After thanking us for the opportunity to address the Old Guard, Lubin elicited a dozen questions to which he responded. His answers informed us that the Taliban get money from drug sales and sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and weapons from Eastern European countries. Al Qaeda is a bigger problem in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. And “YES” we should be talking to the Taliban.
One member considering a career change, asked about the prerequisites to becoming a war lord. Think Tony Soprano.
Respectfully submitted,
Anthony S. Glockler