February 3, 2021
The New Reality at the Mexico-U.S. Border
Douglas Massey
Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, Princeton University
George Bustin, Introducer, and Douglas Massey
Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the 79th Year
President Stephen Schreiber presided over this virtual 18th session of the Old Guard’s 79th year, attended by 105 members and one guest. Len Berlik read the minutes of the previous meeting.
President Schreiber asked those in attendance to participate in an online poll to determine how many members intend to receive, are registered to receive, or have received vaccinations for COVID-19.
President Schreiber asked those in attendance to participate in an online poll to determine how many members intend to receive, are registered to receive, or have received vaccinations for COVID-19.
COVID-19 VACCINATION POLL: SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
I do not intend to get a COVID-19 vaccine. |
0% |
I want to get vaccinated but have not yet registered on the NJ website. |
0% |
I successfully registered but have not yet received dose 1. |
35% |
I have a future appointment to get dose 1. |
15% |
I have received dose 1, but as yet have no appointment for dose 2. |
13% |
I have received dose 1 and have an appointment for dose 2. |
36% |
I received dose 2 less than three weeks ago. |
2% |
George Bustin introduced our speaker, Douglas Massey, Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. With a distinguished career of scholarship focused on immigration studies, he has been elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society and is currently president of the American Academy of Social and Political Science. His most recent book is Brokered Boundaries: Constructing Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times.
Professor Massey outlined statistically the history of immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border since the 1940s; how the realities today differ significantly from earlier periods; and how the U.S. government’s own policies and interventions often trigger the immigration issues and problems we face.
First, he said, we should understand that undocumented immigration from Mexico is practically over. Since 2006, the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants coming into the U.S. is near zero while the number exiting the U.S. increased to 1.35 million between 2007 and 2016. Nevertheless, many who have been here 15-20 years are staying put and do not plan to return to Mexico.
Large influxes of Mexican workers to the U.S. from 1950 to 1965 were sparked by the so-called Bracero program established by Congress in response to requests from growers who needed immigrant labor to harvest their crops. The program provided these workers with temporary legal status. During its 15-year tenure, the number of undocumented Mexicans entering the country was quite small. However, when Congress shut down the program in 1965, the numbers of undocumented Mexicans seeking work in the U.S. correspondingly jumped up to levels comparable to participation in the former program and remained at those levels through 1985.
In that year, some growers won documented status for their workers by sponsoring them. Accordingly, the number of undocumented Mexican workers then dropped appreciably. Then in 2001, various “guest worker” programs were enacted and the number of Mexican workers gaining temporary legal status shot up again while the number of undocumented declined dramatically. In 2015, about 900,000 Mexican workers came into the U.S. on a temporary legal basis; roughly 175,000 entered on a permanent legal basis, while the number of undocumented Mexicans was almost negligible. Because birth rates in Mexico have been quite low for some time, there is no longer a pipeline of young workers attempting undocumented entry into the U.S., and this is likely to persist.
Today, Central Americans, not Mexicans, account for most of the undocumented immigrants arriving at or crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. The great majority are from only three countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Many are coming for reasons that differ profoundly from those espoused by the earlier Mexican immigrants. Many present-day immigrants are not workers, but families or unaccompanied children. Professor Massey proceeded to explain what triggered this sea change.
In 1980, the left-wing Sandinistas seized power in Nicaragua and the U.S. decided to intervene by using so-called “contras” from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to fight them. Professor Massey categorized these three nations as the “frontline countries.” For comparison, he placed Costa Rica and Panama in a “non-frontline” category. He considered Nicaragua separately.
During the 1970s and earlier, emigration from all Central American countries to the U.S. was quite modest. Those levels have persisted down to the present day from Costa Rica and Panama. However, between 1980 and 1990, immigrants fleeing the U.S.-backed Contra-Sandinista conflict from the frontline countries and Nicaragua increased by about 13 times over pre-conflict levels. Though more than 11,000 Nicaraguans were given refugee or asylum status when they fled to the U.S., only a small number of others from the frontline countries were similarly legalized. Professor Massey commented that this reflects a disturbing pattern by the U.S. to legalize immigrants fleeing leftist regimes, as in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, and Vietnam, but not those trying to escape rightist autocracies.
After the Sandinistas left power in Nicaragua in 1990, immigrants to the U.S. from that country dropped to near zero, but emigration from the three frontline countries continued at high levels for both economic and political/social reasons. While the economies of Costa Rica and Panama grew appreciably from 1980 to 2017, economic conditions in the three frontline countries stagnated. When they arrived in the U.S., older undocumented immigrants from the frontline countries were able to find work, but younger males were unable to find employment. Anchorless, they resorted to street gangs that then turned to crime and violence. About 48.4% of total frontline country deportations from the U.S. in 1993 and 63.6% in 1999 were for criminal reasons. These young deportees returned to home countries where there was also no work, so they continued to pursue crime, including violence, to extort means of support. Homicide rates in the three frontline countries reached 66.8% in 1993 and were still at 60.8% as recently as 2008, as compared to 13.7% in Costa Rica and Panama.
In consequence, fearing for their lives and those of their children, families in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador began to flee horrific conditions and seek entry to the U.S. Some sent their children alone. The result was a humanitarian crisis at the border. In mid-2019, 63.6% of apprehensions there by the Department of Homeland Security were families and 8.6% were unaccompanied minors.
Border control systems and immigration facilities were not designed to cope with this. Detention centers were not designed for families or children. Two-thirds of detention centers are privately managed, and it is hard to know what goes on within them. No records were kept of parents separated from their children. COVID may be rampant.
It is not as if we had not managed similar crises in the past. The flight of boat people from Southeast Asia at the end of the Vietnam war generated a flood of refugees now incorporated into the body of the American population. Yet we are not honoring the needs of Iraqis who worked with our forces during our intervention there. We are not honoring commitments to Afghans who worked with us. Distressingly, it appears that we often mess up things in a way that produces refugees and then refuse to take them in.
In response to questions, Professor Massey responded that several sources, using several different methods, estimate that there are about 11 million undocumented residents in the U.S today. China and India account for the largest numbers of new undocumented residents, largely by overstaying their visas. About ten percent of Venezuela’s population has left the country, and we are taking in some, mostly well-educated, on a legal basis. It should be understood that crime rates among the immigrant population are lower than in the native population overall. Unfortunately, labor agreements are impeding efforts to reduce militarization of the border, and though there appears to be broad public support for immigration reform, it is not clear that this is sufficient, because of the filibuster rule, to win enough votes for reform in the U.S. Senate.
Respectfully submitted,
Ralph R. Widner
Professor Massey outlined statistically the history of immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border since the 1940s; how the realities today differ significantly from earlier periods; and how the U.S. government’s own policies and interventions often trigger the immigration issues and problems we face.
First, he said, we should understand that undocumented immigration from Mexico is practically over. Since 2006, the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants coming into the U.S. is near zero while the number exiting the U.S. increased to 1.35 million between 2007 and 2016. Nevertheless, many who have been here 15-20 years are staying put and do not plan to return to Mexico.
Large influxes of Mexican workers to the U.S. from 1950 to 1965 were sparked by the so-called Bracero program established by Congress in response to requests from growers who needed immigrant labor to harvest their crops. The program provided these workers with temporary legal status. During its 15-year tenure, the number of undocumented Mexicans entering the country was quite small. However, when Congress shut down the program in 1965, the numbers of undocumented Mexicans seeking work in the U.S. correspondingly jumped up to levels comparable to participation in the former program and remained at those levels through 1985.
In that year, some growers won documented status for their workers by sponsoring them. Accordingly, the number of undocumented Mexican workers then dropped appreciably. Then in 2001, various “guest worker” programs were enacted and the number of Mexican workers gaining temporary legal status shot up again while the number of undocumented declined dramatically. In 2015, about 900,000 Mexican workers came into the U.S. on a temporary legal basis; roughly 175,000 entered on a permanent legal basis, while the number of undocumented Mexicans was almost negligible. Because birth rates in Mexico have been quite low for some time, there is no longer a pipeline of young workers attempting undocumented entry into the U.S., and this is likely to persist.
Today, Central Americans, not Mexicans, account for most of the undocumented immigrants arriving at or crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. The great majority are from only three countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Many are coming for reasons that differ profoundly from those espoused by the earlier Mexican immigrants. Many present-day immigrants are not workers, but families or unaccompanied children. Professor Massey proceeded to explain what triggered this sea change.
In 1980, the left-wing Sandinistas seized power in Nicaragua and the U.S. decided to intervene by using so-called “contras” from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to fight them. Professor Massey categorized these three nations as the “frontline countries.” For comparison, he placed Costa Rica and Panama in a “non-frontline” category. He considered Nicaragua separately.
During the 1970s and earlier, emigration from all Central American countries to the U.S. was quite modest. Those levels have persisted down to the present day from Costa Rica and Panama. However, between 1980 and 1990, immigrants fleeing the U.S.-backed Contra-Sandinista conflict from the frontline countries and Nicaragua increased by about 13 times over pre-conflict levels. Though more than 11,000 Nicaraguans were given refugee or asylum status when they fled to the U.S., only a small number of others from the frontline countries were similarly legalized. Professor Massey commented that this reflects a disturbing pattern by the U.S. to legalize immigrants fleeing leftist regimes, as in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, and Vietnam, but not those trying to escape rightist autocracies.
After the Sandinistas left power in Nicaragua in 1990, immigrants to the U.S. from that country dropped to near zero, but emigration from the three frontline countries continued at high levels for both economic and political/social reasons. While the economies of Costa Rica and Panama grew appreciably from 1980 to 2017, economic conditions in the three frontline countries stagnated. When they arrived in the U.S., older undocumented immigrants from the frontline countries were able to find work, but younger males were unable to find employment. Anchorless, they resorted to street gangs that then turned to crime and violence. About 48.4% of total frontline country deportations from the U.S. in 1993 and 63.6% in 1999 were for criminal reasons. These young deportees returned to home countries where there was also no work, so they continued to pursue crime, including violence, to extort means of support. Homicide rates in the three frontline countries reached 66.8% in 1993 and were still at 60.8% as recently as 2008, as compared to 13.7% in Costa Rica and Panama.
In consequence, fearing for their lives and those of their children, families in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador began to flee horrific conditions and seek entry to the U.S. Some sent their children alone. The result was a humanitarian crisis at the border. In mid-2019, 63.6% of apprehensions there by the Department of Homeland Security were families and 8.6% were unaccompanied minors.
Border control systems and immigration facilities were not designed to cope with this. Detention centers were not designed for families or children. Two-thirds of detention centers are privately managed, and it is hard to know what goes on within them. No records were kept of parents separated from their children. COVID may be rampant.
It is not as if we had not managed similar crises in the past. The flight of boat people from Southeast Asia at the end of the Vietnam war generated a flood of refugees now incorporated into the body of the American population. Yet we are not honoring the needs of Iraqis who worked with our forces during our intervention there. We are not honoring commitments to Afghans who worked with us. Distressingly, it appears that we often mess up things in a way that produces refugees and then refuse to take them in.
In response to questions, Professor Massey responded that several sources, using several different methods, estimate that there are about 11 million undocumented residents in the U.S today. China and India account for the largest numbers of new undocumented residents, largely by overstaying their visas. About ten percent of Venezuela’s population has left the country, and we are taking in some, mostly well-educated, on a legal basis. It should be understood that crime rates among the immigrant population are lower than in the native population overall. Unfortunately, labor agreements are impeding efforts to reduce militarization of the border, and though there appears to be broad public support for immigration reform, it is not clear that this is sufficient, because of the filibuster rule, to win enough votes for reform in the U.S. Senate.
Respectfully submitted,
Ralph R. Widner