February 4, 2009
A New and Different Culture of Foreign Policy?
Raymond Close
Retired CIA, Middle East Specialist
Minutes of the 17th Meeting of the 67th Year
President Hansen gaveled to order the 17th meeting of the 67th year at 10:15 AM before about 85 members. Don Edwards led in singing the invocation and president Hansen read the minutes of the 16th meeting, originally prepared by David McAlpin, at which Dr. John Haldon spoke of the Avkat Archaeological Project in Turkey.
Bob Varrin, in his introduction, gave a grand tour of the life and career of our fellow member and speaker Ray Close, who then addressed the topic “A New and Different Culture of Foreign policy?” Mr. Close began by citing his presentation to the Old Guard six years ago entitled “What Kind of Superpower do We Want to Be?” At that time, just one year after the invasion of Afghanistan, after “electrifying successes'' the authority of the newly installed Afghan central government was geographically limited, the “hinterland was falling back under the control of corrupt and ruthless warlords,'' and neighboring Pakistan had seen a significant increase in the popular vote for Muslim fundamentalist parties, attributable in the view of Mr. Close to the “awesome display of America's military technology.”
Today's talk was intended to measure progress since then. Recognizing a new and different world, he insisted that terrorism's greatest strength is the “fire in the bellies of young men'' caused by resentment at “injustice, poverty and disease.” Not susceptible to military solution alone, the core problems of "deprivation and injustice'' require the U.S. to "reassert its historic role of moral leadership.'' Mr. Close argued that theU.S. missed the opportunity, after the tragedy of 9/11, to galvanize the world through the United Nations to create new "standards and procedures" to deal collectively with terrorism. A new international rule of law was made impossible by the unilateral, largely military, actions of the U.S., he contended, and the conduct of the war on terrorism has challenged our domestic institutions and individual rights as well.
Since his earlier presentation to the Old Guard, Mr. Close believes that the neo-cons in the Bush administration have transformed the culture of U.S. foreign and security policy by their reliance on unilateral action and by undermining institutional pillars of international law, thereby disaffecting potential allies. In the Middle East, he has seen national security issues as a series of Catch-22s: we are “hoisted on our own self-made petard'' he said. The desire to achieve a “victory of good over evil'' leads to the Catch-22; a path to success consistently posed prohibitive costs or led to the “worsening of-another dangerous threat'' to U.S.interests.
Speaking of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan today, Mr. Close cited the risks of American exceptionalism, saying that what he sees as “simplistic arrogance'' has “limited our vision'' and “deprived us of the moral and political support'' we really need from potential allies. He is worried that the Obama administration may not make a complete break from the Bush Doctrine, one that he sees as imperative.
It is his view that our smashing military defeat of the Taliban ''in 2001 was a ‘mirage,'' we simply drove them into Pakistan sanctuary. Since that time we have failed to provide the manpower and economic resources to enable the fledgling government to capitalize on our initial military success. Mr. Close's attendance at an international conference in Bonn last year further persuaded him that, despite some progress, "the U.S. and its allies were engaged in a campaign that we could not win'' but that “we had made solemn commitments to the Afghan people the we could simply not ignore"; a Catch-22. He believes that unless the Obama administration adopts a new culture of foreign relations, we will abandon Afghanistan once again.
Quoting from his address in Bonn, he pointed out that we do not have the troops and materiel to double our military effort in Afghanistan. We cannot defeat the warlords - and perhaps should not because they are the political web that keeps President Kara afloat - but at the same time the warlords are the major obstacle to the establishment of democracy. Nor can we destroy the opium industry. We do not have a secure base to support military operations in the area. Our emphasis upon targeted assassination causes disproportionate civilian casualties and increases local support for the Taliban. We have been speaking openly of replacing President Karzai without a viable alternative, diminishing our rapport with the democratic element of Afghan society. We have failed to make common cause with other countries concerned about Islamic terrorism, such as Iran, Russia China and India. Our European allies are unwilling to increase their involvement, he believes and, finally, the world economic crisis limits all options.
Questions from the members suggested that while Mr. Close's diagnosis is clear, he does not provide an adequate description of what is meant by cultural change in our foreign policy, nor a well developed prescription for bringing about that change.
President Hansen adjourned the meeting at 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
Russell Marks
Bob Varrin, in his introduction, gave a grand tour of the life and career of our fellow member and speaker Ray Close, who then addressed the topic “A New and Different Culture of Foreign policy?” Mr. Close began by citing his presentation to the Old Guard six years ago entitled “What Kind of Superpower do We Want to Be?” At that time, just one year after the invasion of Afghanistan, after “electrifying successes'' the authority of the newly installed Afghan central government was geographically limited, the “hinterland was falling back under the control of corrupt and ruthless warlords,'' and neighboring Pakistan had seen a significant increase in the popular vote for Muslim fundamentalist parties, attributable in the view of Mr. Close to the “awesome display of America's military technology.”
Today's talk was intended to measure progress since then. Recognizing a new and different world, he insisted that terrorism's greatest strength is the “fire in the bellies of young men'' caused by resentment at “injustice, poverty and disease.” Not susceptible to military solution alone, the core problems of "deprivation and injustice'' require the U.S. to "reassert its historic role of moral leadership.'' Mr. Close argued that theU.S. missed the opportunity, after the tragedy of 9/11, to galvanize the world through the United Nations to create new "standards and procedures" to deal collectively with terrorism. A new international rule of law was made impossible by the unilateral, largely military, actions of the U.S., he contended, and the conduct of the war on terrorism has challenged our domestic institutions and individual rights as well.
Since his earlier presentation to the Old Guard, Mr. Close believes that the neo-cons in the Bush administration have transformed the culture of U.S. foreign and security policy by their reliance on unilateral action and by undermining institutional pillars of international law, thereby disaffecting potential allies. In the Middle East, he has seen national security issues as a series of Catch-22s: we are “hoisted on our own self-made petard'' he said. The desire to achieve a “victory of good over evil'' leads to the Catch-22; a path to success consistently posed prohibitive costs or led to the “worsening of-another dangerous threat'' to U.S.interests.
Speaking of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan today, Mr. Close cited the risks of American exceptionalism, saying that what he sees as “simplistic arrogance'' has “limited our vision'' and “deprived us of the moral and political support'' we really need from potential allies. He is worried that the Obama administration may not make a complete break from the Bush Doctrine, one that he sees as imperative.
It is his view that our smashing military defeat of the Taliban ''in 2001 was a ‘mirage,'' we simply drove them into Pakistan sanctuary. Since that time we have failed to provide the manpower and economic resources to enable the fledgling government to capitalize on our initial military success. Mr. Close's attendance at an international conference in Bonn last year further persuaded him that, despite some progress, "the U.S. and its allies were engaged in a campaign that we could not win'' but that “we had made solemn commitments to the Afghan people the we could simply not ignore"; a Catch-22. He believes that unless the Obama administration adopts a new culture of foreign relations, we will abandon Afghanistan once again.
Quoting from his address in Bonn, he pointed out that we do not have the troops and materiel to double our military effort in Afghanistan. We cannot defeat the warlords - and perhaps should not because they are the political web that keeps President Kara afloat - but at the same time the warlords are the major obstacle to the establishment of democracy. Nor can we destroy the opium industry. We do not have a secure base to support military operations in the area. Our emphasis upon targeted assassination causes disproportionate civilian casualties and increases local support for the Taliban. We have been speaking openly of replacing President Karzai without a viable alternative, diminishing our rapport with the democratic element of Afghan society. We have failed to make common cause with other countries concerned about Islamic terrorism, such as Iran, Russia China and India. Our European allies are unwilling to increase their involvement, he believes and, finally, the world economic crisis limits all options.
Questions from the members suggested that while Mr. Close's diagnosis is clear, he does not provide an adequate description of what is meant by cultural change in our foreign policy, nor a well developed prescription for bringing about that change.
President Hansen adjourned the meeting at 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
Russell Marks