April 19, 2006
The Impact of the North Korean Crisis on Northeast Asia
Gilbert Rozman
Professor of Sociology Princeton University
Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the 64th Year
The ninety members of the Old Guard who attended the 29th meeting of our 64th year (a figure ascertained through the good offices of Arnold Smolens) heard President Haynes begin the meeting smartly at 10:13 a.m. in the Friend Centre. John Marks precented the invocation. Henry King read a masterly summary of last week’s talk on Clark and Lewis of the famed expedition. Bill Haynes sadly announced that Don Dickason had had a quadrupal bypass following a recent heart attack but was progressing nicely. Phil Cruikshank called our attention to the photograph taken last week and was available for members to sign up for copies after the meeting. It was also announced that Charlie Jaffin would be meeting with the Nominating Committee afterwards.
David Dodge introduced the speaker, Gilbert Rozman, the Musgrove Professor of Sociology at Princeton, who has concentrated on the study of northeast Asia, travelled extensively in the region, taught there and intensively studied four of their dominant languages.
Mr. Rozman sketched four topics he considered: the nuclear issue of North Korea, the prospects for Korean reunification and how security networks in the area can develop. The first of these, though not the most interesting to him, took the most time to cover.
North Korea is set in an arena where there are five other players – South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. Like pieces on a chessboard, each time one piece moves, all the others are affected. In 1990 Russia abandoned North Korea who then turned to America, which rebuffed them, wanting only to bring them down. North Korea developed a nuclear programme to ensure the survival of its embattled and isolated regime. After throwing out U.N. inspectors in ’93 and ’94, the American administration eventually reached some sort of modus vivendi, only to fail in meeting its undertakings and the confusion was handed on to the Clinton administration which sabre-rattled. Later, U.S. acquiescence in a less belligerent posture encouraged South Korea’s “sunshine” policy of engagement and cooperation with the north.
Lurking in the U.S. background was an alternative desire for confrontation which got its chance in the Republican administration in 2001. The day after Secretary of State Powell had agreed to give negotiation a chance, that policy was rescinded. The upshot was that the U.S., sensing support from the other four powers, decided to let them go it alone. They were troubled because, whilst not wanting a nuclear North Korea, they could not accept the U.S. tactics which seemed more “war-war” than “jaw-jaw” (to quote Churchill). The speaker briefly surveyed the changing situation for each of the four other players. Russia, once North Korea’s staunchest ally, switched its attention to South Korea and thus lost any leverage it had with the north; Japan, afraid of a militant North Korea, was handicapped by its colonial past and by tactless blunders by its politicians – regarded by both Koreas as an outcast, it has to rely on the U.S. China, at first a supporter of the north, has become the honest broker and feels that whatever advice it offers the Americans is automatically rejected in favour of its truculent opposite. Since the U.S. won’t talk to North Korea directly, China may be forgiven for feeling that we don’t believe in diplomacy, except as a way of complaining about others.
Turning to Korean reunification, he felt that despite centuries of being one country, reunification was not likely in the short term. Perhaps, in the longer term, their trading with China at twice the level they trade with the U.S. may encourage the rapprochement.
Turning to what security arrangements are likely to develop in northeast Asia, he saw two alternatives. One is to go back to the 1950s – the cold war redevivum – in which China, Russia and North Korea create one network with the U.S. and Japan trying to contain it. The drift toward China through trade will preclude the south being part of that latter group. He regarded this scenario as depressing and potentially dangerous. The second alternative is a compromise in which we are able to live with Sino-Russian partnership, a North Korean regime we don’t like, the knowledge that we cannot have everything our own way, and a policy of encouraging Japan to re-enter the arena with tact and imagination since her isolation is not good for us.
All of this would require letting the professional diplomats loose on the scene and doing something about the ignorant simplicities foisted on the public by a media which demonizes North Korea in line with the black-and-white division of the world into goodies versus an “axis of evil”. Two of the ensuing questions from the floor – about the media and our ability to talk one-on-one – seemed to indicate doubts as to whether such enlightenment might be possible. Other questions on the role of Europe and Korean unification were put.
The meeting ended about 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
John Frederick
David Dodge introduced the speaker, Gilbert Rozman, the Musgrove Professor of Sociology at Princeton, who has concentrated on the study of northeast Asia, travelled extensively in the region, taught there and intensively studied four of their dominant languages.
Mr. Rozman sketched four topics he considered: the nuclear issue of North Korea, the prospects for Korean reunification and how security networks in the area can develop. The first of these, though not the most interesting to him, took the most time to cover.
North Korea is set in an arena where there are five other players – South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. Like pieces on a chessboard, each time one piece moves, all the others are affected. In 1990 Russia abandoned North Korea who then turned to America, which rebuffed them, wanting only to bring them down. North Korea developed a nuclear programme to ensure the survival of its embattled and isolated regime. After throwing out U.N. inspectors in ’93 and ’94, the American administration eventually reached some sort of modus vivendi, only to fail in meeting its undertakings and the confusion was handed on to the Clinton administration which sabre-rattled. Later, U.S. acquiescence in a less belligerent posture encouraged South Korea’s “sunshine” policy of engagement and cooperation with the north.
Lurking in the U.S. background was an alternative desire for confrontation which got its chance in the Republican administration in 2001. The day after Secretary of State Powell had agreed to give negotiation a chance, that policy was rescinded. The upshot was that the U.S., sensing support from the other four powers, decided to let them go it alone. They were troubled because, whilst not wanting a nuclear North Korea, they could not accept the U.S. tactics which seemed more “war-war” than “jaw-jaw” (to quote Churchill). The speaker briefly surveyed the changing situation for each of the four other players. Russia, once North Korea’s staunchest ally, switched its attention to South Korea and thus lost any leverage it had with the north; Japan, afraid of a militant North Korea, was handicapped by its colonial past and by tactless blunders by its politicians – regarded by both Koreas as an outcast, it has to rely on the U.S. China, at first a supporter of the north, has become the honest broker and feels that whatever advice it offers the Americans is automatically rejected in favour of its truculent opposite. Since the U.S. won’t talk to North Korea directly, China may be forgiven for feeling that we don’t believe in diplomacy, except as a way of complaining about others.
Turning to Korean reunification, he felt that despite centuries of being one country, reunification was not likely in the short term. Perhaps, in the longer term, their trading with China at twice the level they trade with the U.S. may encourage the rapprochement.
Turning to what security arrangements are likely to develop in northeast Asia, he saw two alternatives. One is to go back to the 1950s – the cold war redevivum – in which China, Russia and North Korea create one network with the U.S. and Japan trying to contain it. The drift toward China through trade will preclude the south being part of that latter group. He regarded this scenario as depressing and potentially dangerous. The second alternative is a compromise in which we are able to live with Sino-Russian partnership, a North Korean regime we don’t like, the knowledge that we cannot have everything our own way, and a policy of encouraging Japan to re-enter the arena with tact and imagination since her isolation is not good for us.
All of this would require letting the professional diplomats loose on the scene and doing something about the ignorant simplicities foisted on the public by a media which demonizes North Korea in line with the black-and-white division of the world into goodies versus an “axis of evil”. Two of the ensuing questions from the floor – about the media and our ability to talk one-on-one – seemed to indicate doubts as to whether such enlightenment might be possible. Other questions on the role of Europe and Korean unification were put.
The meeting ended about 11:30 AM.
Respectfully submitted,
John Frederick