April 27, 2011
How Russia Got the Bomb & How the Americans Found Out: The End of the US Atomic Monopoly
Michael Gordin, Professor of History, Princeton University
Minutes of the 28th meeting of the 69th Year
Presiding: Pres. Robert Varrin presided and convened the 28th meeting of the Old Guard’s 69th year at 10:15 a.m. Don Edwards led the invocation.
Prior Minutes: Bruno Walmsley presented his report of the remarks of the speaker at the April 20th meeting.
Guests: Jock McFarlane introduced Ben Gross; Lanny Jones introduced Joe Wisnovski.
Nominating Committee: Joe Bolster introduced the following slate of next year’s officers and committee chairs which will be voted upon at a subsequent meeting: Officers: President – Robert Varrin; Vice President – Ruth Miller; Secretary – Alfred Kaemmerlen; Treasurer – Guy Dean; Assistant Treasurer – Robert Kuser; Recording Secretary – James Livingston; Assistant Recording Secretary – Quentin Lyle; Ex-Officio – George Hansen. Committee Chairs: Arrangements – Owen Leach; Historian – James Ferry; Hospitality – William Walker; Membership – Jack Reilly; Program – Jock McFarlane; Nominating – Donald Wilson; University Relations – Jotham Johnson; Website – Bruno Walmsley.
Speaker: Jock McFarlane introduced our speaker, Princeton University history professor Michael Gordin. Professor Gordin specializes in the history of the modern physical sciences and Russian scientific and cultural history. His talk was entitled “How Russia Got the Bomb and How the Americans Found Out: The End of the US Atomic Monopoly.
Professor Gordin described a number of constraints which pushed the US into heavy diplomatic and foreign policy reliance on the A-bomb in the immediate post-war era. These included the extremely rapid demobilization of US military forces in mid- to late 1945; the presence of large Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe which greatly overmatched those of the US and its allies in the West; the potential ease of delivering a bomb from air bases in Britain; and the relatively low cost of building and maintaining a sufficient nuclear arsenal verses conventional forces, a fact that appealed to President Truman who was keen on achieving a balanced budget. Thus, The Bomb became a natural counterpoise to Soviet force superiority and let to over-reliance on it as a deterrent.
This balance would obtain, however, only so long as the US had a monopoly on the weapon, so the key question was, how long do we have before Russia develops The Bomb? Professor Gordin cited five factors that entered into this calculation: How hard is it to make an A-bomb? How smart are the Soviets? How hard are they trying (and when did they start)? How much information has been transferred to them through espionage? And finally, how rare is uranium? As to each of these factors, there was a wide range of opinion and a dearth of hard information. Guesstimates ranged from two years to 20 but converged around a five- to ten-year time frame, which, Professor Gordin noted, remained constant throughout the four years until the Russians actually developed their bomb.
So, how did the Soviets do it? The conventional explanation is by spying, but, Professor Gordin said, “It’s a lot more complicated than that.” He reviewed the contributions of several of the more prominent names in spying – Igor Gouzenko and the Rosenbergs – but said their contributions were minimal. The two who did make the greatest contribution – Klaus Fuchs and Ted hall, both of whom worked for a time at Los Alamos – did so by identifying the necessity for making an implosion rather than a gun-type plutonium bomb. That insight at least saved the Soviets potential time lost in going down that particular blind alley. Professor Gordin also described the elaborate spy networks the Russians established in the US starting with the initiation of Lend Lease in March 1941. The most important sources of information drawn on by the Russians, however, turned out to be open source materials and journals published in the US during and after the war, supplemented by a relatively small number of documents – probably no more than 150-160 of real interest – pilfered by Fuchs, Hall and other spies and the infusion of some German nuclear specialists after 1945.
Although the Russians first tested their A-bomb on August 29, 1949, they made no public announcement of the event. How, then, did the US find out? Professor Gordin pointed out that the US had only a limited governmental intelligence apparatus in the immediate post-war period and no spy network in the USSR whatsoever. Still, efforts were being made to apply scientific methods to detection, and it was through the use of airborne radiological measurement that evidence of a Soviet nuclear test was first detected on September 3, 1949. Even after confirmation of the fact in the following week or so, President Truman delayed a public statement until September 23 so that it would not precede announcement of England’s devaluation of the Pound.
Professor Gordin concluded his remarks by describing how the end of the US atomic monopoly became the pretext for America’s expansion of the Cold War. Resulting steps included rapid expansion of fission bomb production, intensification of work on a hydrogen bomb, support for European countries’ expansion of their conventional military forces, and the National Security Council Paper 68 which led to increased militarization of US efforts to contain Russia. This expansionary trend was accelerated by the onset of Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s hunt for Communists in the government and the start of the Korean War in June 1950.
Adjournment: President Varrin adjourned the meeting at 11:30 a.m.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard O. Scribner
Prior Minutes: Bruno Walmsley presented his report of the remarks of the speaker at the April 20th meeting.
Guests: Jock McFarlane introduced Ben Gross; Lanny Jones introduced Joe Wisnovski.
Nominating Committee: Joe Bolster introduced the following slate of next year’s officers and committee chairs which will be voted upon at a subsequent meeting: Officers: President – Robert Varrin; Vice President – Ruth Miller; Secretary – Alfred Kaemmerlen; Treasurer – Guy Dean; Assistant Treasurer – Robert Kuser; Recording Secretary – James Livingston; Assistant Recording Secretary – Quentin Lyle; Ex-Officio – George Hansen. Committee Chairs: Arrangements – Owen Leach; Historian – James Ferry; Hospitality – William Walker; Membership – Jack Reilly; Program – Jock McFarlane; Nominating – Donald Wilson; University Relations – Jotham Johnson; Website – Bruno Walmsley.
Speaker: Jock McFarlane introduced our speaker, Princeton University history professor Michael Gordin. Professor Gordin specializes in the history of the modern physical sciences and Russian scientific and cultural history. His talk was entitled “How Russia Got the Bomb and How the Americans Found Out: The End of the US Atomic Monopoly.
Professor Gordin described a number of constraints which pushed the US into heavy diplomatic and foreign policy reliance on the A-bomb in the immediate post-war era. These included the extremely rapid demobilization of US military forces in mid- to late 1945; the presence of large Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe which greatly overmatched those of the US and its allies in the West; the potential ease of delivering a bomb from air bases in Britain; and the relatively low cost of building and maintaining a sufficient nuclear arsenal verses conventional forces, a fact that appealed to President Truman who was keen on achieving a balanced budget. Thus, The Bomb became a natural counterpoise to Soviet force superiority and let to over-reliance on it as a deterrent.
This balance would obtain, however, only so long as the US had a monopoly on the weapon, so the key question was, how long do we have before Russia develops The Bomb? Professor Gordin cited five factors that entered into this calculation: How hard is it to make an A-bomb? How smart are the Soviets? How hard are they trying (and when did they start)? How much information has been transferred to them through espionage? And finally, how rare is uranium? As to each of these factors, there was a wide range of opinion and a dearth of hard information. Guesstimates ranged from two years to 20 but converged around a five- to ten-year time frame, which, Professor Gordin noted, remained constant throughout the four years until the Russians actually developed their bomb.
So, how did the Soviets do it? The conventional explanation is by spying, but, Professor Gordin said, “It’s a lot more complicated than that.” He reviewed the contributions of several of the more prominent names in spying – Igor Gouzenko and the Rosenbergs – but said their contributions were minimal. The two who did make the greatest contribution – Klaus Fuchs and Ted hall, both of whom worked for a time at Los Alamos – did so by identifying the necessity for making an implosion rather than a gun-type plutonium bomb. That insight at least saved the Soviets potential time lost in going down that particular blind alley. Professor Gordin also described the elaborate spy networks the Russians established in the US starting with the initiation of Lend Lease in March 1941. The most important sources of information drawn on by the Russians, however, turned out to be open source materials and journals published in the US during and after the war, supplemented by a relatively small number of documents – probably no more than 150-160 of real interest – pilfered by Fuchs, Hall and other spies and the infusion of some German nuclear specialists after 1945.
Although the Russians first tested their A-bomb on August 29, 1949, they made no public announcement of the event. How, then, did the US find out? Professor Gordin pointed out that the US had only a limited governmental intelligence apparatus in the immediate post-war period and no spy network in the USSR whatsoever. Still, efforts were being made to apply scientific methods to detection, and it was through the use of airborne radiological measurement that evidence of a Soviet nuclear test was first detected on September 3, 1949. Even after confirmation of the fact in the following week or so, President Truman delayed a public statement until September 23 so that it would not precede announcement of England’s devaluation of the Pound.
Professor Gordin concluded his remarks by describing how the end of the US atomic monopoly became the pretext for America’s expansion of the Cold War. Resulting steps included rapid expansion of fission bomb production, intensification of work on a hydrogen bomb, support for European countries’ expansion of their conventional military forces, and the National Security Council Paper 68 which led to increased militarization of US efforts to contain Russia. This expansionary trend was accelerated by the onset of Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s hunt for Communists in the government and the start of the Korean War in June 1950.
Adjournment: President Varrin adjourned the meeting at 11:30 a.m.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard O. Scribner