May 7, 2014
The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
Jacob Shapiro
Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
Jacob Shapiro
Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the 72nd Year
There were 111 people present.
Two members, Lee Neuwirth and Charles Clark, had guests.
The minutes of the previous meeting were read.
The speaker at the May 7 meeting was Jacob Shapiro, Associate Prof of Politics, Princeton University.
His subject was The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
Essentially Professor Shapiro had two concerns. One was to present his observations about the broad array of organizational models of terrorist groups. His observations were focused on how these groups were structured, organized, and managed. The second concern was to discuss implications for policy approaches in dealing with the groups, and to help put the threats they pose into perspective.
Why this study? Professor Shapiro explained he became interested in this subject while he was in the Navy and was sent to take part in some counterterrorism planning. In his analysis he noticed there was considerable conflict both within and between terrorist groups that were being looked at in the Caucasus and the Levant No one had a good explanation for this conflict in groups usually assumed to be monolithic entities. For policy makers, the problem was that since the groups are not monolithic entities it was necessary though difficult to take these conflicts into account in order to design effective counter terrorism strategies against them. Professor Shapiro therefore began studying the subject when he went back to grad school.
In his talk he illustrated his argument with information from the terrorist's own internal correspondence and from the database of documents captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the late 1990s. He suggested a number of reasons for the conflicts within the terrorist groups: the two most important ones appear to be disputes over organizational spending, not surprising because of limited resources, and over tactics.
His main starting point was that a surprising amount of information was written down by the groups, considered they are or were supposed to be covert. Why was so much written down? Shapiro mentioned some of the items included in the information available:
In one case the information came from an al-Qaeda group. The number was so large that all the information had to be put on a large spreadsheet so that, as the bureaucratic managers of the group said, ''we can figure out the profile of a good mujahideen." Considerable information of the same kind was found in Iraq in 2004. Some of the documents of the groups discussed the procedure for the selection of new operatives.
Why do the conflicts in the groups occur and why so much written information about them? The starting factor was that since there was a need to use agents to carry out activities, therefore inevitable disputes arose about them.
Wrong people may have been recruited. Shapiro indicated that groups may recruit people who are good at violence and killing but who are otherwise undesirable. He gave an example that came from Mohamed Mathu who led terrorist operations in Kenya. Recruits to his movement were good at eliminating traitors and were very active in stealing guns and other supplies. But they insisted on being quickly paid for the goods they had stolen. This desire to make personal gains out of the revolution damaged what Mathu regarded as the just struggle against British colonialism.
Another conflict arose over tactics and strategy. Operating underground meant the groups found it hard to know what to do and how to reach agreement on action, and the likely consequences of action. Shapiro showed a letter dated June 2012 written to Khalid Sheik Mohamed (KSM) saying that Bin Laden was pushing him relentlessly and without consideration, and so ''we must completely halt all extemal actions until we sit down and consider the disaster we caused.”
Differences of opinion in the groups were also expressed on the level of violence to be used.
From a managerial point of view groups sought ways to moderate the disputes, to reduce security risks, or inefficiencies, but they had handicaps. A number (5) of possible methods were mentioned:
Organizations require rationality, bureaucracy, hierarchy. Wages are set rationally. Salary spread sheets show the flat fees to operatives, special claims, expenses, number in family (certainly with al-Qaeda) and also the expectation of graft.
Policy implications:
Terrorism is self-limiting in 4 respects a) vigilance of counterterrorism b) there's no real safe haven c) care is needed in use of violence: those aged 18-25 are most idealistic and most stupid d) if leaders want to negotiate, they might lose credibility among their followers.
Therefore, the result of typical organizational behavior is that the group is left in hands of action-oriented leaders, who successfully remain underground.
Conclusion: We should not view these political organizations as something unique and exceptionally threatening.
Ultimately, they are neither. They are mundane but dangerous. They suffer from deep and intractable organizational dilemmas. If these factors are understood it will make counter terrorism efforts more effective.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael Curtis
Two members, Lee Neuwirth and Charles Clark, had guests.
The minutes of the previous meeting were read.
The speaker at the May 7 meeting was Jacob Shapiro, Associate Prof of Politics, Princeton University.
His subject was The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations
Essentially Professor Shapiro had two concerns. One was to present his observations about the broad array of organizational models of terrorist groups. His observations were focused on how these groups were structured, organized, and managed. The second concern was to discuss implications for policy approaches in dealing with the groups, and to help put the threats they pose into perspective.
Why this study? Professor Shapiro explained he became interested in this subject while he was in the Navy and was sent to take part in some counterterrorism planning. In his analysis he noticed there was considerable conflict both within and between terrorist groups that were being looked at in the Caucasus and the Levant No one had a good explanation for this conflict in groups usually assumed to be monolithic entities. For policy makers, the problem was that since the groups are not monolithic entities it was necessary though difficult to take these conflicts into account in order to design effective counter terrorism strategies against them. Professor Shapiro therefore began studying the subject when he went back to grad school.
In his talk he illustrated his argument with information from the terrorist's own internal correspondence and from the database of documents captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the late 1990s. He suggested a number of reasons for the conflicts within the terrorist groups: the two most important ones appear to be disputes over organizational spending, not surprising because of limited resources, and over tactics.
His main starting point was that a surprising amount of information was written down by the groups, considered they are or were supposed to be covert. Why was so much written down? Shapiro mentioned some of the items included in the information available:
- oath statements for would be suicide bombers
- oaths taken by someone leaving the country for medical treatment.
- oaths taken by people leaving the group permanently.
In one case the information came from an al-Qaeda group. The number was so large that all the information had to be put on a large spreadsheet so that, as the bureaucratic managers of the group said, ''we can figure out the profile of a good mujahideen." Considerable information of the same kind was found in Iraq in 2004. Some of the documents of the groups discussed the procedure for the selection of new operatives.
Why do the conflicts in the groups occur and why so much written information about them? The starting factor was that since there was a need to use agents to carry out activities, therefore inevitable disputes arose about them.
Wrong people may have been recruited. Shapiro indicated that groups may recruit people who are good at violence and killing but who are otherwise undesirable. He gave an example that came from Mohamed Mathu who led terrorist operations in Kenya. Recruits to his movement were good at eliminating traitors and were very active in stealing guns and other supplies. But they insisted on being quickly paid for the goods they had stolen. This desire to make personal gains out of the revolution damaged what Mathu regarded as the just struggle against British colonialism.
Another conflict arose over tactics and strategy. Operating underground meant the groups found it hard to know what to do and how to reach agreement on action, and the likely consequences of action. Shapiro showed a letter dated June 2012 written to Khalid Sheik Mohamed (KSM) saying that Bin Laden was pushing him relentlessly and without consideration, and so ''we must completely halt all extemal actions until we sit down and consider the disaster we caused.”
Differences of opinion in the groups were also expressed on the level of violence to be used.
From a managerial point of view groups sought ways to moderate the disputes, to reduce security risks, or inefficiencies, but they had handicaps. A number (5) of possible methods were mentioned:
- You can form familial relationships and recruit within trusted networks, but then counter terrorists know where to look.
- Punishing people is problematic ... there may be an outside option to go elsewhere (cf. academic and higher pay)
- Require record keeping to head off disputes, but this entails opportunities for compromise.
- Screen people before they join e.g. examine their ideology but a) people may fake ideology b) the Fatah leader (Black September) Abu Iyad found Jordanian agents pretended to be fanatic militants. Iyad said "diehard extremists are either imbeciles or traitors."
- Who are true believers? Bin Laden said in certain conditions it's OK to kill fellow Muslims who are not
Organizations require rationality, bureaucracy, hierarchy. Wages are set rationally. Salary spread sheets show the flat fees to operatives, special claims, expenses, number in family (certainly with al-Qaeda) and also the expectation of graft.
Policy implications:
Terrorism is self-limiting in 4 respects a) vigilance of counterterrorism b) there's no real safe haven c) care is needed in use of violence: those aged 18-25 are most idealistic and most stupid d) if leaders want to negotiate, they might lose credibility among their followers.
Therefore, the result of typical organizational behavior is that the group is left in hands of action-oriented leaders, who successfully remain underground.
Conclusion: We should not view these political organizations as something unique and exceptionally threatening.
Ultimately, they are neither. They are mundane but dangerous. They suffer from deep and intractable organizational dilemmas. If these factors are understood it will make counter terrorism efforts more effective.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael Curtis