September 25, 2013
The Ethics and Law of Targeted Killing by Remotely Controlled Weapons
Jeff McMahan
Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University
The Ethics and Law of Targeted Killing by Remotely Controlled Weapons
Jeff McMahan
Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University
Minutes of the Third Meeting of the 72nd Year
The third meeting of the 72nd Year was called to order by president Ruth Miller at 10:15 am.
111 members were present. Don Edwards led the invocation. Guests were introduced: Tom Fulmer presented his brother David; Diana Crane presented her friend Liz Hosny; Joan Fleming her husband John; and Al Kaemmerlen his wife.
Charles Rojer read the minutes of the previous meeting.
Glenn Cullen introduced the speaker, Jeff McMahan, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He described him as an accomplished individual who has a Rhode’s Scholarship, a MacArthur Award and a Guggenheim Fellowship to his credit. He has published numerous papers and several books which Glenn summarized. He described Professor McMahan as one who identifies problems in the world and tries to rectify them. He observed that although the traditional approach to philosophic issues is to start from a general thesis and see how that principle plays out in particular circumstances, Professor McMahan typically goes in the opposite direction, moving from a specific scenario to discover what moral and ethical principles are thereby invoked.
In his address, entitled “The Ethics and Law of Targeted Killing by Remotely Controlled Weapons” the professor certainly demonstrated the value of this approach as he offered his answer to that urgent and topical question, “Is the use of drones a good thing or a bad thing, and why?”
Like any good philosopher he first defined the issues, established his premises, and offered his conclusions. His reasoning was clear and cogent, and not readily summarized in five minutes, but…here goes.
He chose to start with practical aspects of the use of drones. They can hover for hours patiently waiting as they monitor evolving situations, they’re more discriminating than bombs, and they keep the operator from harm. On the other hand “mistakes may be made” (that’s a technical military term), the wrong individual may be targeted, and innocent civilians may be killed.
So outside the battlefield, where almost anything goes, are drones morally and legally justified? McMahan believes that a terrorist morally forfeits his right to life by posing a threat of wrongful, lethal harm. By the same reasoning, on very rare occasions, torture may be justified. When a terrorist is actively engaged in killing or even just planning to kill, a preemptive strike is morally justified. McMahan emphasized, however, that such action should always be undertaken as a preventative measure, not a punitive or retributive one. For this reason he feels that the killing of Osama bin Laden, though it may have been politically or logistically necessary, was not morally justified.
The law intersects moral issues in curious ways. Laws of war offer impunity to combatants who kill, and gives rights to prisoners of war. But a soldier also has a duty to identify himself, to wear a uniform for example, and avoid killing civilians. Terrorists, however, by very definition, do not meet these requirements and thus they forfeit any claim to impunity. And Professor McMahan clarified, in response to a later question, that only a state may declare war, so although they may claim to be engaging in a holy war, terrorists fail to meet this legal criterion.
So, if terrorists are not combatant soldiers, what are they? They must be seen as simply criminals. And as such they should be subject to criminal law, arrested, tried in a court, and sentenced appropriately. However it is usually the case that terrorists are hidden in remote villages or inaccessible locations, so when logistical circumstances preclude legal niceties, extrajudicial killings can be morally justified. McMahan noted that the use of such tactics has become all too familiar to us as police shoot-to-kill those crazed gunmen who bedevil our society.
Of course targeted killing by drones has many morally repugnant aspects. Innocents are often killed; half the world separates the drone operator from the target victim and may encourage wanton and excessive use; and a dead terrorist is no use as an informer. Perhaps more serious are the problems that result as the use of drones provides a precedent for others, and invites a proliferation of these weapons, possibly on American soil: a most unwelcome scenario.
Still, I believe professor McMahan’s position is well summarized in these words of another philosopher at another time: “…were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their observance of them, where they no longer serve any purpose; and must render every action or reencounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors.” It’s almost 300 years since David Hume penned these words. Plus ca change.
Respectfully submitted,
Roger Moseley
111 members were present. Don Edwards led the invocation. Guests were introduced: Tom Fulmer presented his brother David; Diana Crane presented her friend Liz Hosny; Joan Fleming her husband John; and Al Kaemmerlen his wife.
Charles Rojer read the minutes of the previous meeting.
Glenn Cullen introduced the speaker, Jeff McMahan, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He described him as an accomplished individual who has a Rhode’s Scholarship, a MacArthur Award and a Guggenheim Fellowship to his credit. He has published numerous papers and several books which Glenn summarized. He described Professor McMahan as one who identifies problems in the world and tries to rectify them. He observed that although the traditional approach to philosophic issues is to start from a general thesis and see how that principle plays out in particular circumstances, Professor McMahan typically goes in the opposite direction, moving from a specific scenario to discover what moral and ethical principles are thereby invoked.
In his address, entitled “The Ethics and Law of Targeted Killing by Remotely Controlled Weapons” the professor certainly demonstrated the value of this approach as he offered his answer to that urgent and topical question, “Is the use of drones a good thing or a bad thing, and why?”
Like any good philosopher he first defined the issues, established his premises, and offered his conclusions. His reasoning was clear and cogent, and not readily summarized in five minutes, but…here goes.
He chose to start with practical aspects of the use of drones. They can hover for hours patiently waiting as they monitor evolving situations, they’re more discriminating than bombs, and they keep the operator from harm. On the other hand “mistakes may be made” (that’s a technical military term), the wrong individual may be targeted, and innocent civilians may be killed.
So outside the battlefield, where almost anything goes, are drones morally and legally justified? McMahan believes that a terrorist morally forfeits his right to life by posing a threat of wrongful, lethal harm. By the same reasoning, on very rare occasions, torture may be justified. When a terrorist is actively engaged in killing or even just planning to kill, a preemptive strike is morally justified. McMahan emphasized, however, that such action should always be undertaken as a preventative measure, not a punitive or retributive one. For this reason he feels that the killing of Osama bin Laden, though it may have been politically or logistically necessary, was not morally justified.
The law intersects moral issues in curious ways. Laws of war offer impunity to combatants who kill, and gives rights to prisoners of war. But a soldier also has a duty to identify himself, to wear a uniform for example, and avoid killing civilians. Terrorists, however, by very definition, do not meet these requirements and thus they forfeit any claim to impunity. And Professor McMahan clarified, in response to a later question, that only a state may declare war, so although they may claim to be engaging in a holy war, terrorists fail to meet this legal criterion.
So, if terrorists are not combatant soldiers, what are they? They must be seen as simply criminals. And as such they should be subject to criminal law, arrested, tried in a court, and sentenced appropriately. However it is usually the case that terrorists are hidden in remote villages or inaccessible locations, so when logistical circumstances preclude legal niceties, extrajudicial killings can be morally justified. McMahan noted that the use of such tactics has become all too familiar to us as police shoot-to-kill those crazed gunmen who bedevil our society.
Of course targeted killing by drones has many morally repugnant aspects. Innocents are often killed; half the world separates the drone operator from the target victim and may encourage wanton and excessive use; and a dead terrorist is no use as an informer. Perhaps more serious are the problems that result as the use of drones provides a precedent for others, and invites a proliferation of these weapons, possibly on American soil: a most unwelcome scenario.
Still, I believe professor McMahan’s position is well summarized in these words of another philosopher at another time: “…were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their observance of them, where they no longer serve any purpose; and must render every action or reencounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors.” It’s almost 300 years since David Hume penned these words. Plus ca change.
Respectfully submitted,
Roger Moseley